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Abstract—The secure distribution of protected content requires 
consumer authentication and involves the conventional method of 
end-to-end encryption. However, in information-centric 
networking (ICN) the end-to-end encryption makes the content 
caching ineffective since encrypted content stored in a cache is 
useless for any consumer except those who know the encryption 
key. For effective caching of encrypted content in ICN, we propose 
a novel scheme, called the Secure Distribution of Protected 
Content (SDPC). SDPC ensures that only authenticated 
consumers can access the content. The SDPC is a lightweight 
authentication and key distribution protocol; it allows consumer 
nodes to verify the originality of the published article by using a 
symmetric key encryption. The security of the SDPC was proved 
with BAN logic and Scyther tool verification. 
Index Terms— Information-Centric Networking, Content 
Distribution, In-network Caching, Authentication, Effective 
Caching 
I. INTRODUCTION 
INCE the earliest time of the Internet, its underlying 
architecture has been based on packet-switching and host-
to-host communication. The TCP/IP layered architecture 
employs the same view and provides an abstract host-to-host 
communication model to communication applications. 
However, in the recent past there has been a profound increase 
in Internet connectivity, and with the emergence of new Internet 
applications, the Internet semantics have changed from host 
centric to content centric. To satisfy the needs of emerging 
internet applications, the current TCP/IP Internet architecture 
has adopted several application layer solutions known as Over-
the-Top (OTT) applications, such as Content Delivery Network 
(CDN), web caching, and peer-to-peer networking [1-3]. The 
additions of new OTT applications are leading us towards a 
very complex internet architecture, and are introducing 
challenges to achieving efficiency, security, privacy etc.at 
acceptable economical cost. In this perspective, Information-
Centric Networking (ICN) has emerged as a promising 
architecture for the Future Internet.  
ICN represents a paradigm shift from host-centric to content-
centric services and from a Source-driven to Receiver-driven 
approach. In the ICN paradigm the network is then in charge of 
doing the mapping between the requested content and where it 
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can be found. To do so, network level naming is used for 
identifying content objects, independent of their location or 
container [4]. This means that the ICN architecture decouples 
content from the host at the network level and supports the 
temporary storage of content in an in-network cache [5-6]. The 
benefits of the ubiquitous caching in ICN are profound, but it 
also introduces a challenge to content security.    
In an earlier work [7], the author presented a scheme for 
protected content using network coding as encryption. However, 
that scheme requires a private connection between the publisher 
and consumer to obtain the decoding matrix and some missing 
data blocks. In another study [8], the author presented a security 
framework for the distribution of encrypted copyright video 
streaming in ICN. However, each video was encrypted with a 
large number of symmetric encryptions keys, such that each 
video frame was encrypted with a unique symmetric encryption 
key. Only authorized users who possessed the set of all keys 
could decrypt the video content. The distribution of a large 
number of keys for each video content is an extra 
communication overhead.  
A. Problem statement 
The distribution of protected content requires the 
authentication of the consumer and involves a conventional 
type of end to end encryption. However, in information-centric 
networking (ICN) the end-to-end encryption for each 
authorized subscriber makes the content caching ineffective.  
 
Figure 1 The ineffective caching in ICN with end-to-end encryption 
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As shown in Figure 1, the consumers  𝑁𝐴 and 𝑁𝐵 subscribe to 
the protected content. Consumer 𝑁𝐴  sent an interest packet 
𝐼𝐴encapsulating authorization information for the content. In 
reply, based on the subscription information, the publisher 𝑃 
authenticates the consumer and checks the authorization of 
content object 𝑂𝑗  for the consumer 𝑁𝐴 . If 𝑁𝐴  is a valid 
subscriber than publisher 𝑃  encrypts the requested content 
segment 𝑆1,𝑗  and sends it to consumer 𝑁𝐴 , encrypted with a 
consumer specific key. Based on the basic semantics of the 
information-centric networking (ICN), the intermediate cache 
routers 𝑅1 and 𝑅2 stores the encrypted content segment 𝑆1,𝑗,for 
future use.  
In the next step, consumer 𝑁𝐵 requests the same content. As 
shown in Figure 1-a, if the meta data of the encrypted stored 
packet is available to  𝑅1, then based on the basic semantics of 
ICN the intermediate cache router 𝑅1will reply with the cached 
content 𝑆1,𝑗 to consumer 𝑁𝐵 . However, consumer 𝑁𝐵  cannot 
decrypt the content segment𝑆1,𝑗  as it was solely intended for 
consumer 𝑁𝐴.  
On the other hand, as shown in Figure 1-b, if the meta data of 
the encrypted stored packet is unavailable to  𝑅1, that is, the 
meta data is also encrypted, then the interest packet𝐼𝐵 will be 
forwarded to the publisher. If 𝑁𝐴  is a valid subscriber then 
publisher 𝑃will encrypt the requested content segment 𝑆1,𝑗 and 
send it to consumer 𝑁𝐴, encrypted with a consumer specific key. 
The solution is to encrypt each content segment with a key 
known to all subscribers; which raises three fundamental 
questions. How does one ensure that only an authenticated 
subscribed consumer can access the content? How can the 
consumer verify the originality of the published article; that is, 
do we still need self-certifying? Finally, and most importantly, 
how can encryption keys be distributed among all of the 
consumers for each content segment?  We will answer all these 
questions in this work. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 
II, we present a brief system model overview. Section-III 
describes the proposed scheme with a detailed discussion.  In 
Section-IV, we assess the strength of using BAN logic and 
Scyther verification. Finally, we provide concluding remarks in 
Section –V. 
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND SKETCH OF PROPOSED SCHEME 
 
 
Figure 2 Illustration of system model used in proposed scheme. 
The system model used throughout this work is shown in 
Figure 2. To enable the ICN core network to support the 
effective caching of encrypted content we introduce a new 
entity, designated subscription manager 𝑀 . We assume that 
there is a secret number 𝑛𝑆
𝑖  associated with each valid 
subscriber consumer that is known to the subscription manager 
𝑀, that is, the valid consumers are already registered with the 
subscription manager 𝑀 . Note that being registered doesn’t 
mean the consumer is entitled to access certain protected 
content. Moreover, subscription manager 𝑀 can be a module 
installed on the publisher or it could be an independent entity in 
the network.  
In this work we assume that subscription manager 𝑀is an 
independent entity associated with multiple publishers. This 
design reduces the message exchange complexity for the case 
when a consumer decides to subscribe to multiple protected 
contents published by different publishers. 
When a registered consumer is interested in protected content 
they first need subscribe to the protected content, for instance, 
subscribing to a movie channel. In the first step, the consumer 
sends an interest request for the protected content along with 
the subscription request, and the publisher node routes the 
request towards subscription manager 𝑀 . The subscription 
manager 𝑀  authenticates consumer 𝑁𝐴 and in response 
publisher 𝑃 sends the encryption key generation 
information 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝑀𝑆𝐺. Using 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝑀𝑆𝐺 as a seed for a simple hash 
function, consumer 𝑁𝐴and publisher 𝑃 can generate a chain of 
keys. Publisher 𝑃 uses these keys to encrypt the segments of the 
published content; likewise, after acquiring 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝑀𝑆𝐺 consumer 
𝑁𝐴  generates the same keys to decrypt the segments of the 
published content. Detailed descriptions of the key generation 
and secure subscription are discussed in subsequent sections. 
 
Figure 3An example of secure delivery of protected content 
Let’s consider the case where consumer 𝑁𝐴  is already a 
registered consumer node. As shown in Figure 3, consumer 𝑁𝐴 
sends an interest packet 𝐼𝐴,𝑖  encapsulating authorization 
information for the protected content object 𝑂𝑖,. Let us say that 
protected content object 𝑂𝑖 is composed of 𝑘  number of 
segments 𝑆 = {𝑆1,𝑖 , 𝑆2,𝑖 …𝑆𝑘,𝑖}; further, the intermediate cache 
routers 𝑅1  and 𝑅2  have copies of the protected content 
segments, represented by 𝑆𝑅1,𝑖 ⊆ 𝑆  and 𝑆𝑅2,𝑖 ⊆ 𝑆 . If 𝑁𝐴  is a 
valid subscriber then publisher 𝑃 sends the encryption key 
generation information 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝑀𝑆𝐺 to consumer 𝑁𝐴 .   After 
receiving the key generation information, the consumer can 
decrypt the content segments, which may be delivered directly 
from the intermediate cache router. 
III. PROPOSED SCHEME 
The SDPC protocol suite consists of two protocol suites, the 
Keying Protocol suite and the Subscription and Content Access 
Protocol suite. The Keying Protocol suite is comprised of a key 
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generation protocol and a key agreement protocol for content 
protection. Likewise, the Content Access Protocol further 
comprises four protocols, one dealing with the consumer node 
subscription and the other three dealing with access to the 
protected contents published by the different types of publishers. 
The SDPC protocol suite is described in detail in subsequent 
sections. 
A. Keying Protocol Suite 
In the keying protocol suite, the key generation protocol 
generates a ‘commitment key’ using an irreversible function 
similar to the ones used in [9-10]. The ‘commitment key’ is 
further used to drive multiple keys. 
The key generation mechanism for the content protection is 
shown in Figure 4 and consists of the following steps: 1) The 
publisher divides the large contents into equal sized segments. 
2) For each protected content object 𝑂𝑗the publisher generates 
a unique commitment key generator by using an irreversible 
one way hash function 𝜁0
𝑗 = 𝐻(𝑇𝑃 ,  𝑂𝑗)  , where 𝑇𝑃 is the time 
of publishing and 𝑂𝑗 represents the content name and version. 
3) The publisher now generate a “Chain of Key Generators” of 
length 𝐿 =
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑜𝑓(𝑂𝑗)
𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
  by using an irreversible one-way 
function:  {𝐻(𝜁0
𝑗) = 𝜁1
𝑗 , 𝐻(𝜁1
𝑗) =  𝜁2
𝑗
 …𝐻(𝜁𝑙−1
𝑗 ) = 𝜁𝑙
𝑗} ;  i-e 
𝐻(𝜁𝑘
𝑗)
𝑖
= 𝜁𝑘+𝑖
𝑗 . 4) Each generator (𝜁) in the chain is used by 
function 𝑔 at a specific index location in the chain to derive a 
content segment encryption key. For instance, at index 𝑘 the 
function 𝑔(𝜁𝑘
𝑗) = 𝐻(𝜁𝑘
𝑗 , 𝐾𝑝) generates the key 𝐾𝑘
𝑗
used for 
encrypting the 𝑘𝑡ℎ segment of the content object𝑂𝑗, where 𝐾𝑝 
is the public key of the publisher. 
 
Figure 4 Symmetric keys generation and admission with reference to 
segment number of protected content 
The symmetric keys generated as a result of SDPC keying 
protocol have size of 256 bits (32 bytes); hence, in the 
subsequent section of authentication protocols any symmetric 
encryption supporting the 256-bit key can be used, e.g., RC5/6; 
Rijndael, Twofish, MARS, and Blowfish symmetric encryption 
algorithms support the 256-bit encryption key. 
B. Subscription and Content Access Protocol suite 
When a consumer wants to subscribe to the protected content, 
for instance a movie database, they gain initial access using a 
subscription protocol (SubP). After SubP the consumer can use 
the ticket to access multiple protected contents published by the 
publishers, or managed by a third party. In subsequent sections, 
the Subscription and Content Access Protocol suite are 
described in detail. 
a) Initial Access and Subscription Protocol (SubP) 
If a consumer node 𝑁𝑖  wants to subscribe to the protected 
content, for instance subscribing for the movie channel, in the 
first step,  𝑁𝑖 generates an encryption key 𝐾𝑇𝑆
𝑖 = 𝐻(𝐾𝑝
𝑗⊕𝑛𝑆
𝑖 ), 
where 𝐾𝑝
𝑗
 is the public key of publisher and 𝑛𝑆
𝑖  is a secret 
number shared with the subscription manager 𝑀. The consumer 
sends an interest request for the protected content along with 
the subscription request, encrypting the secret number 𝑛𝑆
𝑖with  
𝐾𝑇𝑆
𝑖 . The publisher node routes the request towards 𝑀, and the 
protocol continues as follows: 
 
Figure 5 Message exchange for initial access and subscription protocol 
M1. As shown in Figure 5, 𝑁𝑖 injects a subscription interest 
packet 𝐼𝑖 . The ICN core network forwards it to the 
publisher 𝑃𝑗. The interest packet encloses the 𝑛0
𝑖  which is 
encrypted with the generated encryption key 𝐾𝑇𝑆
𝑖 .  
M2. Upon receiving the request from 𝑁𝑖 , the 𝑃𝑗  forwards the 
request in conjunction with its identity and challenge 𝑛2 to 
the subscription manager 𝑀. Note that 𝑃𝑗  cannot decrypt 
the part of the interest packet, which is encrypted with key 
𝐾𝑇𝑆
𝑖  and holds the secret registration number 𝑛𝑆
𝑖 . 
M3. 𝑀  retrieves the profile from the database, and if  𝑁𝑖 is a 
legitimate consumer, 𝑀  generates the keys 𝐾𝑇𝑆
𝑖 =
𝐻(𝐾𝑝
𝑗⊕𝑛𝑆
𝑖 ) , 𝐾𝑆
𝑖 = 𝐻(𝑇𝑀⊕𝑛𝑆
𝑖 ) , and  sends 𝑢0 =
𝐸𝑇𝑆
𝑖 (𝑛𝑆
𝑖 + 1 ||𝑛1 ||𝑇𝑘|| 𝐾𝑠
𝑖)  to 𝑃𝑗 in M3, 𝑇𝑀 is the time of 
issuing the session key 𝐾𝑆
𝑖. M3 also includes ticket 𝑇𝑘 =
𝐸𝑃
𝑗(𝑁𝑖||𝐾𝑠
𝑖|| 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑒) , 𝑛1 (a challenge for 𝑁𝑖 ), and 𝑛2 
(challenge response for the 𝑃𝑗), all encrypted with 𝐾𝑝
𝑗
. The 
publisher 𝑃𝑗  verifies the challenge  𝑛2 , stores 𝑛1  and 
retrieves the profile and 𝐾𝑠
𝑖 from the ticket. Note that the 
ticket is encrypted with the public key of the publisher. The 
consumer node 𝑁𝑖 cannot decrypt it, but can use it to 
subscribe to other contents published by the publisher𝑃𝑗, 
without contacting subscription manager 𝑀. 
M4. 𝑃𝑗forwards the𝑢0 to 𝑁𝑖 along with the 𝐾𝐸𝑌𝑀𝑆𝐺 = (𝜁0
𝑗 , 𝐾𝑝), 
which is required to decrypt the segments of the published 
content. After a challenge ( 𝑛0
𝑖 + 1) 
verification,𝑁𝑖accepts 𝑇𝑘  and generates the key chain to 
decrypt the protected published content. The key chain is 
generated using the public key of 𝑃𝑗, hence, the content is 
also self-certifying. 
M5. 𝑃𝑗 sends the challenge response (𝑛1 + 1)  to 𝑀  for the 
confirmation of a successful protocol run.  
M6. After challenge (𝑛1 + 1) confirmation, 𝑃𝑗  may optionally 
register the 𝑁𝑖 in its own database. If 𝑃𝑗 does not receive a 
challenge response within a certain period of time, then 𝑃𝑗 
marks 𝑇𝑘 as a stolen ticket.   
In the SubP, a secure exchange of 𝑛0 ensures the message 
authentication between the consumer and the publisher, 𝑛2 
between the publisher and subscription manger, and 𝑛1between 
the subscription manger and the publisher, while message 
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authentication between the consumer and publisher is 
established by session key encryption and 𝑛1.  
b) Content Access Protocols 
(1) Access Protocol after Subscription (APSub) 
Further, if consumer 𝑁𝑖wishes to access some other protected 
contents published by the publisher 𝑃𝑗, then 𝑁𝑖sends an interest 
request for the protected content along with the ticket 𝑇𝑘and the 
protocol continues as follows: 
 
Figure 6 Message exchange for access protocol after subscription 
M1. As shown in Figure 6, 𝑁𝑖 injects a subscription interest 
packet, enclosing 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑒𝑞 = 𝐸𝑆
𝑖(𝑁𝑖 ||𝑛0)||𝑇𝑘 . The ICN 
core network forwards it to the publisher 𝑃𝑗.  The publisher 
𝑃𝑗decrypts the ticket, retrieves 𝐾𝑠
𝑖 ,   verifies sender identity 
𝑁𝑖. If the value 𝑁𝑖 does not match, the 𝑃𝑗 will ignore the 
request and otherwise proceed as follows. 
M2. 𝑃𝑗  sends a challenge response along with the new challenge 
encrypted with session key 𝐾𝑠
𝑖 .𝑃𝑗also send the 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝑀𝑆𝐺 , 
which is required to decrypt the segments of the published 
content. 
M3. 𝑁𝑖sends the challenge response 𝑛1. If 𝑃𝑗 does not receive 
the challenge response within a certain period of time, then 
𝑃𝑗 marks 𝑇𝑘 as a stolen ticket.  
In the above APSub, the secure exchange of 𝑛0
𝑖 ensures the 
message authentication between the consumer and the publisher.  
(2) Access Protocol after Subscription involving a Third party 
(APSub3) 
Assume a consumer 𝑁𝑖 subscribed with 𝑃𝑖, which means it 
shares a session key 𝐾𝑠
𝑖 with 𝑃𝑖 and holds a 𝑇𝑘 encrypted with 
public key of 𝑃𝑖 . Now if  𝑁𝑖  wishes to access the protected 
contents published by a third-party content publisher 𝑃𝑗 , 
APSub3 continues as follows: 
 
Figure 7 Message exchange for access protocol after subscription 
involving a third party 
M1. As depicted in (3) at Figure 3-b, 𝑁𝑖 injects a subscription 
interest packet enclosing 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑒𝑞 = 𝐸𝑆
𝑖(𝑁𝑖 ||𝑛0)||𝑇𝑘 
and the packet is forwarded to the publisher 𝑃𝑗.  
M2.  Upon receiving the request from 𝑁𝑖 , 𝑃𝑗  forwards the 
request in conjunction with its identity and the challenge 
𝑛2  to 𝑀 . Note that 𝑃𝑗  cannot decrypt 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑒𝑞  in the 
interest packet, which is encrypted with a shared session 
key 𝐾𝑠
𝑖  between 𝑁𝑖  and 𝑃𝑖 , which ensures the third-party 
content distributor cannot misuse the consumer secure 
information, such as profile and secret share number etc. 
M3.  𝑀 retrieves the profile from 𝑇𝑘 , and if 𝑁𝑖 is a legitimate 
consumer, 𝑀  generates the key 𝐾𝑇𝑆
𝑖 = 𝐻(𝐾𝑠
𝑖⊕𝑛0), and 
sends 𝑢0 = 𝐸𝑆
𝑖(𝑛0 + 1 ||𝑛1 ||𝐾𝑒𝑦𝑀𝑆𝐺) to 𝑃𝑗. The message 
M3 also includes the key 𝐾𝑇𝑆
𝑖 , 𝑛1 a challenge for 𝑁𝑖, and 
𝑛2 the challenge response for 𝑃𝑗, which are encrypted with 
public key pf 𝑃𝑗 . After that, the publisher 𝑃𝑗  verifies the 
challenge response 𝑛2 and stores 𝑛1. Note that the ticket is 
encrypted with the public key of 𝑃𝑖 . Therefore, 𝑁𝑖  and 
third-party publisher 𝑃𝑗 cannot decrypt it. Also, 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝑀𝑆𝐺 is 
inaccessible to 𝑃𝑖 , which ensures that the third-party 
content distributor cannot misuse the protected content. 
M4.  𝑃𝑗  forwards 𝑢0 ||𝐸𝑇𝑆
𝑖 (𝑃𝑗) to 𝑁𝑖 . After the verification of 
the challenge (𝑛0 + 1), 𝑁𝑖  generates 𝐾𝑇𝑆
𝑖 = 𝐻(𝐾𝑠
𝑖⊕𝑛0) 
and sends the challenge response (𝑛1 + 1) to 𝑃𝑗. Now 𝑁𝑖 
can generate a key chain to decrypt the protected published 
content. Since the key chain is generated using the public 
key of 𝑃𝑖, the content is also self-certifying. 
M5.  𝑃𝑗  sends the challenge response (𝑛1 + 1)  to 𝑀  for the 
confirmation of a successful protocol run.  
M6.  After the challenge confirmation, 𝑃𝑗  closes the protocol 
run. If 𝑃𝑗 does not receive any challenge response within a 
certain period of time, 𝑃𝑗 marks 𝑇𝑘 as a stolen ticket.   
In SubP3, secure exchanges of 𝑛0 , 𝑛1 , and 𝑛2  ensure the 
message authentication between the consumer and the 
subscription manger, between the subscription manger and the 
third-party publisher, and between the third-party publisher and 
subscription manger, respectively. On the other hand, the 
message authentication between the consumer and the third-
party publisher is established by a temporary session key 𝐾𝑇𝑆
𝑖  
and 𝑛1.   
C. MPEG Video Distribution: An application of the proposed 
scheme 
This section briefly explains how our proposed scheme can 
be used for the effective distribution of protected MPEG video 
in ICN. In MPEG the video is defined as a stream of a group of 
pictures (GOPs). As shown in Figure 8, each GOP consists of 
one I frame (Intra-coded picture) and multiple P (Predicted 
picture) and B (Bidirectional predicted picture) frames. To 
recover the video in its real quality most of the information is 
stored in the I-Frame. If a publisher 𝑃𝑖  publishes a protected 
MPEG video, by encrypting the I-Frame the video remains 
protected. The partial encryption of each GOP is the same as 
the method employed in [7] but with SDPC the subscriber can 
generate a large number of keys with the exchange of just a 
single commitment key. 
Using our proposed scheme, the publisher 𝑃𝑖  generates a 
chain of keys for the protected content object 𝑂𝑗 and encrypts 
the I-Frame in each GOP using a corresponding key from the 
key chain; for instance the I-frame of GOP1 is encrypted with 
𝐾1
𝑗
. When a consumer 𝑁𝑖  injects the first interest packet, 
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whether enclosing a subscription or access request, the 
publisher 𝑃𝑗 sends the 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝑀𝑆𝐺 to consumer 𝑁𝑖. Meanwhile, the 
intermediate custodian nodes transfer the data to consumer 𝑁𝑖. 
The consumer 𝑁𝑖 then generates the chain of keys and decrypts 
all of the I-Frame segments using the corresponding keys.  
 
Figure 8 The structure of video content and usage of SDPC keying 
protocol. 
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
This section presents an inclusive security analysis of the 
SDPC protocol using BAN logic [11], and also presents the 
Scyther [12] implementation result of the SDPC. 
A. Formal security analysis using BAN logic 
BAN logic [11] is widely used for the formal analysis of 
security protocols. To verify the security of the SDPC protocol 
suite it is sufficient to demonstrate the security of the SubP 
protocol; the rest of the protocols are extensions of the SubP, 
which use the ticket and session key established in the SubP 
protocol run. The three basic objects of BAN logic are 
principals, formula/statements, and encryption keys. The 
principals, the protocol participants, are represented by symbols 
𝑃and 𝑄 . The formula/statements are symbolized by 𝑋 and 𝑌 
and represents the content of the message exchanged. The 
encryption keys are symbolized by 𝐾. The logical notations of 
BAN-logic used for our analysis is given below: 
• 𝑃 ⊨ 𝑋:𝑃 believes 𝑋, or 𝑃 would be enabled to believe 𝑋; 
in conclusion, 𝑃 can take 𝑋 as true. 
• 𝑃 ⋖ 𝑋: 𝑃 sees/receives 𝑋 . 𝑃 initially has or received a 
message 𝑋 and 𝑃 can see the contents of the message and 
is capable of repeating 𝑋. 
• 𝑃|~𝑋: 𝑃once said 𝑋. 𝑃 has sent a message including the 
statement 𝑋 .However, the freshness of message is 
unknown. 
• 𝑃 ⟹ 𝑋:𝑃 controls 𝑋  and should be trusted for 
formula/statement 𝑋. 
• #(𝑋): 𝑋 is fresh; it says,  𝑋 never sent by any principal 
before.  
• 𝑃
    𝐾   
↔  𝑄: 𝑃 and𝑄  shares a key 𝐾 to communicate in a 
secure way and 𝐾 is only known to 𝑃 , 𝑄  and a trusted 
principal. 
• (𝑋)𝐾: The statement 𝑋 is encrypted by key 𝐾. 
• {𝑋}𝑌: It stand for 𝑋 combined with 𝑌. 𝑌 is anticipated to be 
secret and its implicit or explicit presence proves the 
identity of a principal who completes the  {𝑋}𝑌. 
Some primary BAN-logic postulates used in the analysis of 
the SDPC are given below: 
• Message meaning rules: 
𝑃⊨𝑃
    𝐾   
↔   𝑄,𝑃⋖(𝑋)𝐾
𝑃⊨𝑄|~𝑋
 ,
𝑃⊨𝑃
    𝑌   
↔   𝑄,𝑃⋖{𝑋}𝑌
𝑃⊨𝑄|~𝑋
 
• Nonce verification rule: 
𝑃⊨#(𝑋),𝑃⊨𝑄|~𝑋  
𝑃⊨𝑄⊨𝑋
 
• Jurisdiction rule: 
𝑃⊨𝑄⟹𝑋,𝑃⊨𝑄⊨𝑋  
𝑃⊨𝑋
 
• Freshness rule: 
𝑃⊨#(𝑋)
𝑃⊨(𝑋,𝑌)
 
• Believe rule:  
𝑃⊨𝑄⊨(𝑋,𝑌)  
𝑃⊨𝑋,𝑃⊨𝑌
 
• Session key rule: 
𝑃⊨𝑄#(𝑋),𝑃⊨𝑄⊨𝑋  
𝑃⊨𝑃
    𝐾   
↔   𝑄
 
a) Ban Logic Analysis of SubP: 
The SubP protocol should achieve the following goals which 
states that both the consumer and the publisher trust the 
encryption key 𝐾𝑆
𝑖 for the secure exchange of 𝐾𝐸𝑌𝑀𝑆𝐺  : 
1. 𝑁𝑖 ⊨ (𝑁𝑖
   𝐾𝑆
𝑖
↔ 𝑃𝑗) 
2. 𝑁𝑖 ⊨ 𝑃𝑗 ⊨ (𝑁𝑖
   𝐾𝑆
𝑖
↔ 𝑃𝑗) 
3. 𝑃𝑗 ⊨ (𝑁𝑖
   𝐾𝑆
𝑖
↔ 𝑃𝑗) 
4. 𝑃𝑗 ⊨ 𝑁𝑖 ⊨ (𝑁𝑖(𝑁𝑖
𝐾𝑆
𝑖
↔𝑃𝑗) 
Protocol Idealization: 
M1. 𝑁𝑖
𝑉𝑖𝑎 𝑃𝑗
↔   𝑀: {𝑛0, (𝑁𝑖
𝑛𝑆
𝑖
↔𝑀)}
𝐻(𝑋𝑆)
 
M2. 𝑃𝑗 → 𝑀: {𝑛2, 𝐼𝐷𝑃𝑗} 
M3. 𝑀 → 𝑃𝑗: {(𝑛1, 𝑛2, (𝑁𝑖 (
   𝐾𝑆
𝑖
↔ )𝑃𝑗 , # (𝑁𝑖 (
   𝐾𝑆
𝑖
↔ )𝑃𝑗))
𝐾𝑃
𝑗
)
𝐾𝑃
𝑗
, {𝑛0, 𝑛1, (𝑁𝑖
(
   𝐾𝑆
𝑖
↔ )𝑃𝑗 , # (𝑁𝑖 (
   𝐾𝑆
𝑖
↔ )𝑃𝑗))
𝐾𝑃
𝑗
, 𝑁𝑖 (
   𝐾𝑆
𝑖
↔ )𝑃𝑗 , # (𝑁𝑖 (
   𝐾𝑆
𝑖
↔ )𝑃𝑗) , 𝑁𝑖
𝑛𝑆
𝑖
↔𝑀}
𝐻(𝑋𝑆)
}  
M4. 𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝑖𝑎 𝑀
↔   𝑁𝑖: {𝑛0, 𝑛1, (𝑁𝑖
   𝐾𝑆
𝑖
↔ 𝑃𝑗 , # (𝑁𝑖
   𝐾𝑆
𝑖
↔ 𝑃𝑗))
𝐾𝑃
𝑗
, 𝑁𝑖
   𝐾𝑆
𝑖
↔ 𝑃𝑗 , # (𝑁𝑖
   𝐾𝑆
𝑖
↔ 𝑃𝑗) , 𝑁𝑖
𝑛𝑆
𝑖
↔𝑀}
𝐻(𝑋𝑆)
 
M5. 𝑃𝑗 → 𝑁𝑖: (𝐾𝐸𝑌𝑀𝑆𝐺)𝐾𝑠𝑖 
M6. 𝑁𝑖 → 𝑃𝑗: (𝑛1)𝐾𝑆
𝑖  
Initial State Assumptions: 
A1. 𝑀 ⊨ #(𝑛0) 
A2. 𝑀 ⊨ #(𝑛2) 
A3. 𝑃𝑗 ⊨ #(𝑛1) 
A4. 𝑁𝑖 ⊨ #(𝑛1) 
A5. 𝑁𝑖 ⊨ (𝑁𝑖
𝐾𝑇𝑆=𝐻(𝑋𝑆)
↔       𝑀) 
A6. 𝑀 ⊨ (𝑁𝑖
𝐾𝑇𝑆=𝐻(𝑋𝑆)
↔       𝑀) 
A7. 𝑃𝑗 ⊨ (𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝑃
𝑗
↔𝑀) 
A8. 𝑀 ⊨ (𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝑃
𝑗
↔𝑀) 
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A9. 𝑀 ⊨ 𝑁𝑖 ⊨ (𝑁𝑖
𝐾𝑇𝑆=𝐻(𝑋𝑆)
↔       𝑀) 
A10. 𝑁𝑖 ⊨ 𝑀 ⊨ (𝑁𝑖
𝐾𝑇𝑆=𝐻(𝑋𝑆)
↔       𝑀) 
A11. 𝑀 ⊨ 𝑃𝑗 ⊨ (𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝑃
𝑗
↔𝑀) 
A12. 𝑃𝑗 ⊨ 𝑀 ⊨ (𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝑃
𝑗
↔𝑀) 
Let us analyze the protocol to show that 𝑁𝑖  and 𝑃𝑗  share a 
session key: 
From M1, we have 
𝑀 ⋖ {𝑛0, (𝑁𝑖
𝑛𝑆
𝑖
↔𝑀)}
𝐻(𝑋𝑆)
 (1) 
The (1), A6 and message meaning rule infers that 
𝑀 ⊨ 𝑁𝑖|~ {𝑛0, (𝑁𝑖
𝑛𝑆
𝑖
↔𝑀)} (2) 
The A1 and freshness conjuncatenation comprehends that 
𝑀 ⊨ #{𝑛0, (𝑁𝑖
𝑛𝑆
𝑖
↔𝑀)}  (3) 
The (2), (3) and nonce verification rule deduces that 
𝑀 ⊨ {𝑁𝑖 ⊨ 𝑛𝑆
𝑖 , 𝑛0, (𝑁𝑖
𝑛𝑆
𝑖
↔𝑀)} (4) 
The (4) and believe rule infers that 
𝑀 ⊨ 𝑁𝑖 ⊨ (𝑁𝑖
𝑛𝑆
𝑖
↔𝑀)  (5) 
From A2, (5) and jurisdiction rule, it concludes 
𝑀 ⊨ (𝑁𝑖
𝑛𝑆
𝑖
↔𝑀)   (6) 
This belief confirms that 𝑀 has received a message from a 
legitimate𝑁𝑖. 
From M2, we have 
𝑀 ⋖ 𝑛2       (7) 
The (7) and message meaning it infers that 
𝑀 ⊨ 𝑃𝑗|~𝑛2     (8) 
The A2, A1, (3) and freshness conjuncatenation 
comprehends that 
 
𝑀 ⊨ #{𝑛0, 𝑛2, (𝑁𝑖
𝑛𝑆
𝑖
↔𝑀)}  (9) 
According to nonce freshness, this proves that 𝑀 confirms 
that 𝑁𝑖 is recently alive and running the protocol with 𝑀. 
From M3, we have 
𝑃𝑗 ⋖ (𝑛1, 𝑛2, (𝑁𝑖
   𝐾𝑆
𝑖
↔ 𝑃𝑗 , # (𝑁𝑖
   𝐾𝑆
𝑖
↔ 𝑃𝑗) , 𝑛0
𝑖 )
𝐾𝑃
𝑗
)
𝐾𝑃
𝑗
  (10) 
The A7 and (10) deduce that 
𝑃𝑗 ⊨ 𝑀|~{𝑛1, 𝑛0
𝑖 , 𝑁𝑖
   𝐾𝑆
𝑖
↔ 𝑃𝑗 , # (𝑁𝑖
   𝐾𝑆
𝑖
↔ 𝑃𝑗)}     (11) 
The A3, (11) and freshness conjuncatenation comprehends 
that 
 
𝑃𝑗 ⊨ #{𝑛1, 𝑛0
𝑖 , 𝑁𝑖
   𝐾𝑆
𝑖
↔ 𝑃𝑗 , # (𝑁𝑖
   𝐾𝑆
𝑖
↔ 𝑃𝑗)}     (12) 
The (11), (12) and nonce verification rule infers that 
𝑃𝑗 ⊨ 𝑀 ⊨ {𝑛1, 𝑛0
𝑖 , 𝑁𝑖
   𝐾𝑆
𝑖
↔ 𝑃𝑗, # (𝑁𝑖
   𝐾𝑆
𝑖
↔ 𝑃𝑗) , 𝑉𝑖}   (13) 
The (13) and believe rule comprehends that 
𝑃𝑗 ⊨ 𝑀 ⊨ (𝑁𝑖
   𝐾𝑆
𝑖
↔ 𝑃𝑗)    (14) 
The logic belief proves that 𝑃𝑗 is confident and believes that 
𝐾𝑆
𝑖  is issued by 𝑀 ; moreover, the freshness of the key also 
suggests that 𝑀is alive and running the protocol with 𝑃𝑗and 𝑁𝑖. 
The (13), (14) and jurisdiction rule concludes that 
 
𝑃𝑗 ⊨ (𝑁𝑖
   𝐾𝑆
𝑖
↔ 𝑃𝑗)    (15) Goal-3 
From M4, we have 
 
𝑁𝑖 ⋖ {𝑛1, 𝑁𝑖
   𝐾𝑆
𝑖
↔ 𝑃𝑗 , # (𝑁𝑖
   𝐾𝑆
𝑖
↔ 𝑃𝑗) ,𝑁𝑖
𝑛𝑆
𝑖
↔𝑀}
𝐻(𝑋𝑆)
  (16) 
The (16), A5 and message meaning rule comprehends that 
𝑁𝑖 ⊨ 𝑀|~{𝑛1, 𝑁𝑖
   𝐾𝑆
𝑖
↔ 𝑃𝑗 , # (𝑁𝑖
   𝐾𝑆
𝑖
↔ 𝑃𝑗)}   (17) 
The (17), A4 and freshness conjuncatenation rule infers that 
𝑁𝑖 ⊨ #{𝑛1, 𝑁𝑖
   𝐾𝑆
𝑖
↔ 𝑃𝑗 , # (𝑁𝑖
   𝐾𝑆
𝑖
↔ 𝑃𝑗)}   (18) 
The (17), (18) and nonce verification rule deduce that 
 
𝑁𝑖 ⊨ 𝑀 ⊨ {𝑛1, , 𝑁𝑖
   𝐾𝑆
𝑖
↔ 𝑃𝑗 , # (𝑁𝑖
   𝐾𝑆
𝑖
↔ 𝑃𝑗)}   (19) 
The (19) and believe rule infers that 
𝑁𝑖 ⊨ 𝑀 ⊨ {𝑁𝑖
   𝐾𝑆
𝑖
↔ 𝑃𝑗}    (20) 
The (19), (20) and jurisdiction rule concludes that 
 
𝑁𝑖 ⊨ {𝑁𝑖
   𝐾𝑆
𝑖
↔ 𝑃𝑗}    (21) Goal-1 
From M5, we have 
 
𝑁𝑖 ⋖ 𝐼𝐷𝑆𝑗    (22) 
The (15), (21), (22) and meaning rule comprehends that 
𝑃𝑗 ⊨ 𝑁𝑖 ⊨ {𝑁𝑖
   𝐾𝑆
𝑖
↔ 𝑃𝑗}   (23) Goal-4 
From M6,we have  
𝑃𝑗 ⋖ 𝑛1  (24) 
The (15), (21), (23) and nonce verification rule deduce that 
 
𝑁𝑖 ⊨ 𝑃𝑗 ⊨ {𝑁𝑖
   𝐾𝑆
𝑖
↔ 𝑃𝑗}   (23) Goal-2 
B. Verifying the protocol using the Scyther tool 
 The previous section proved that according to the BAN logic 
the SDPC is a secure authentication scheme. The Ban logic 
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provides a foundation for the formal analysis of security 
protocols, but few attacks can slip through the BAN logic [11]. 
For further proof of the strength of the SDPC protocol suite, we 
implemented the SDPC in an automated security protocol 
analysis tool, Scyther [12]. We considered four claims: 
Aliveness, weak agreement, non-injective agreement, and non-
injective synchronization. For a detailed description of the 
protocol claims, please refer to [13-14].  
Table 5.1 SCYTHER TOOL PARAMETER SETTINGS 
Parameter Settings 
Number of Runs 1~3 
Matching Type Find all Type Flaws 
Search pruning Find All Attacks 
Number of pattern per claim 10 
In Scyther the protocol is modeled as an exchange of 
messages among different participating ‘roles'; for instance, the 
consumer node is in the role of initiator, the publisher is in the 
role of responder and the subscription manger is in the role of a 
server. The Scyther tool integrates the authentication properties 
into the protocol specification as a claim event. We tested our 
protocol by employing the claims mentioned earlier, with the 
parameter settings given in Table I. 
 
Figure 9 Scyther results for the SDPC SubP protocol 
The protocol is tested using given parameter in Table I. The 
results are shown in Figure 9. It is clear that SubP protocol 
qualifies all the protocol claims and no attacks were found. 
Hence, for a large number of systems and scenarios, our 
protocol guarantees safety against a large number of known 
attacks, such as impersonating, man-in-middle   and replay 
attacks, etc. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In information-centric networking (ICN), end-to-end 
encryption for each subscriber makes content caching 
ineffective, since encrypted content stored in a cache is not 
useful for any other consumer except those consumers who 
know the encryption key. For effective caching of encrypted 
content, we proposed a novel scheme, called the Secure 
Distribution of Protected Content (SDPC). In the SDPC scheme 
we designed two protocol suites, the Keying Protocol suite and 
Subscription and Content Access Protocol suite. The 
Subscription and Content Access Protocol suite ensures that 
only authenticated consumers can access the content; hence, 
providing protection to content. The SDPC’s keying protocol 
suite empowers the publisher and consumer to generate 
multiple symmetric encryption keys with the exchange of just a 
single commitment key. The commitment key is generated with 
the publishers’ public key, along with other secret credentials, 
and allows the consumer to verify the originality of the 
published article. In other words, self-certifying is achieved 
with symmetric key encryption. In the conventional ICN 
architecture, the self-certifying is achieved by means of 
asymmetric cryptography, which is computationally much 
more expensive compared to symmetric key encryption. Hence, 
SDPC is a lightweight and efficient solution for the secure 
content distribution in ICN. 
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